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NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
MORTGAGES - REMEDIES - EFFECT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ACT
A deficiency judgment act was first passed by. the North
Dakota legislature in 1933.1 This act was amended in 1937,2
and it is this latter act which has been adopted by our present
code.s
The purpose of this article is to set forth various effects this
legislation has had upon the law of mortgages in North Dakota.
• A criticized I characteristic of the North Dakota mortgage
law prior to this act was in relation to the effect of covenants
for title in junior mortgages as laid down by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Sletten v. First National Bank of James-
town.5 In the Sletten Case a bank holding a mortgage, later ac-
quired a third mortgage on the same property. Upon foreclos-
ing the third mortgage, the court held that the bank's pur-
chase of the land at the foreclosure sale was necessarily a
purchase "subject to" its own senior mortgage; that thereby
the land became the "primary fund" for the payment of that
debt. It has been stated that such reasoning, as making the
land the "primary fund" under such a curcumstance, may be
proper if the junior mortgage was in the form of a quitclaim
deed, but the junior mortgage in this case was not so, but
instead was in the form of a warranty deed, as they generally
are. This mortgage contained the following covenants: of
seisin and right to convey; that the premises were "clear and
free from all encumbrances, except two mortgages of record
for $800 and $1500 respectively; that the said first party, his
heirs and assigns, will forever warrant and defend the title
to the same unto the said second party, his heirs and assigns,
against all lawful claims of all persons whomsoever;" and a
further covenant to pay the mortgage debt.6
Although a mortgage in North Dakota is only a lien on the
land, the covenants contained therein mean what they say, and
are effective as in a straight warranty deed.7 The mortgagor
I N.D. Session Laws 1933, Chapter 155.
N.D. Session Laws 1937, Chapter 159.
a N.D. Rev. Code (1943) See. 32-1903, 32-1906 and 32-1907.
4 Ross, Covenants of Title in Junior Mortgages, 12 MINN. L. Rzy. 34 (1927).
6 37 N.D. 47, 163 N.W. 534 (1917).
0 This mortgage is of record in the office of the register of deeds at Jamestown,
N. D., in Book 39 of Mortgages, page 113.
7 Adams v. McClintock, 21 N.D. 384, 131 N.W. 394 (1941); Gunsch v. Urban
Mere. Co. 35 N.D. 390, 160 N.W. 69 (1916).
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in the Situation of the Sletten Case was duty bound to pay the
prior claims for the benefit and protection of the third mort-;
gagee's title and security. This is due to the general warranty
contained in the junior mortgage in spite of the exception of
the. covenant against encumbrances. 8 The mortgagor ought to
pay both debts in full, without resort to the land by either
mortgagee.
It appears that if the mortgage in question were executed
after 1937, such a question would never arise. Under the
present law, the land is always the "primary fund." By law
we have completely abrogated any personal obligation on the
part of the mortgagor, his assigns, or successors in interest.
The North Dakota Code 0 provides: "Neither before nor after
the rendition of a judgment for the foreclosure of a real es-
tate mortgage or for the cancellation or foreclosure of a land
contract made after July 1, 1937, shall the mortgagee or ven-
dor, or the successor in interest of either, be authorized or
permitted to bring any action in any court in this state for the
recovery of any part of the debt secured by the mortgage or
contract so foreclosed. It is the intent of this section that no
defieiency judgment shall be rendered upon any note, mort-
gage, or contract given since July 1, 1937, to secure the pay-
ment of money loaned upon real estate or to secure the pur-
chase price of real estate, and in case of default the holder
of a real estate mortgage or land contract shall be entitled
only to a foreclosure of the mortgage or the cancellation or
foreclosure of the contract."
Noting the above Code provision, it is apparent that the
mortgagee can only foreclose the mortgage, he has no remedy
on the note; therefore, the land is the "primary fund." To
illustrate the extent to which the note may be used today, it
will be more clearly explained by showing the former effect
of the note.
In First National Bank of St. Thomas v. Flath,1 the de-
fendant Flath owed Noyes Brothers $1,176.80, and one Mc-
Bride was surety for Flath on his debt. Flath then executed
a note and mortgage to McBride to indemnify him against
any liability arising out of the suretyship. By separate in-
strument, such intent was expressed and also added that the
s Smith v. Baub, 19 N.D. 337, 123 N.W. 827 (1910).
9 N.D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 32-1907.
10 10 N.D. 281, 86 N.W. 867 (1901).
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mortgage was to be satisfied when Flath paid Noyes Brothers
the full amount of his indebtedness. By the: time this Uction
was brought, Flath had paid Noyes Brothers all the debt ex-
cept $50.00. The note and mortgage given to McBride were
duly recorded ,and on July 11, 1898, McBride endorsed the
note and assigned the mortgage to the plaintiff. These trans-
actions were properly recorded. After the note had become in
default, the plaintiff sued Flath on the note for the full amount
of the note. The trial court held that the plaintiff was an en-
dorsee in due course and was free of any defense Flath would
have against McBride, and allowed a full recovery. On appeal
the judgment was affirmed. The court stated "I that the plain-
tiff could either sue on the note or foreclose the mortgage, since
the mortgage shares in the same immunity from equities
existing between the original parties as the note it secures.
Such a result could not take place today, since as before
stated, the mortgagee's, or his assign's or successor's in inter-
est, only remedy is against the land, that is, a foreclosure of
the mortgage. However, in a similar set of facts today, the
plaintiff would have a cause of action against the mortgagee,
that is, if the mortgagee endorsed the note in-blank and not
without recourse. By statute 12 he could foreclose the mort-
gage and join the original mortgagee as a party defendant,
and obtain whatever deficiency resulted from the foreclosure
sale from the original mortgagee - endorser. That seems to
be the only possible construction of the last sentence of Sec.
32-1903 where it is stated, "Nothing elsewhere contained in
this chapter shall be construed to postpone or affect any reme-
dies the creditor may have against any person personally
liable for the debt, other than the mortgagor or purchaser and
the successors in interest of either."
As to the old question of whether or not the note is ne-
gotiatbe, it seems today the note must be held to be non-nego-
tiable,1 8 since the maker cannot be held liable on it. The only
time the note can be sued upon is when the mortgagee en-
dorses the note in blank to a third party for value. It is in
effect as though a new instrument were executed. With the
note non-negotiable, the law as stated by statute*" is as the
11 10 N.D. 281, 286, 86 N.W. 867 (1901).
12 N.D. Rev. Code (1948) Sec. 32-1903.
is See 22 CAL. L. Rev. 677 (1934).
14 N.D. Rev. Code (1948) See. 32-1908.
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decided weight of authority, to the effect that the endorsement
of a non-negotiable note by the payee or transferee renders
him liable to his endorsee."
Another situation where the law has made a change, is in
a case such as Shelly v. Mikkelson.e The facts of that case are
that on Jan. 1, 1890, plaintiff contracted to sell a parcel of
land to defendant, the land having a prior incumbrance upon
it. The defendant executed two promissory notes to the plain-
tiff. All the proceedings were duly recorded. The contract was
to the effect that the plaintiff was to convey by warranty
deed, subject to the taxes subsequent to the contract, and sub-
ject to the first mortgage, when the defendant had broken
eighty acres and secured the above mentioned notes with a
crop mortgage for the year 1891. After the maturity* of the
notes, the plaintiff brought an action at law for the amount
due on the notes. The Supreme Court held that the action
on the notes was erroneous, because the time for delivery of
the deed had passed before suit was brought for the purchase
price, therefore, plaintiff's only remedy was for specific per-
formance of the contract.
If the case were tried today, with a land contract, executed
after July 1, 1937, it will be noted that this remedy has been
abolished. The code 17 definitely states that in case of default,
the holder of a land contract shall be' entitled only to the can-
cellation or foreclosure of the contract.
A recent case, Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Kelly 1
illustrates one phase of the old law. The mortgage in this case
was executed before July 1, 1937, therefore the new law is not
applicable. In that case one Heffernan, in August, 1925, exe-
cuted two notes, one due Jan. 1, 1926, and the other due Jan. 1,
1936, secured by a mortgage in the sum of $8,000.00 to the
Royal Life Insurance Company. In March 1934, the Royal
Life Insurance Company ' assigned the mortgage and notes
to the plaintiff. Since Heffernan was in default since 1926, the
plaintiff, in July 1935, foreclosed and there was a deficiency
of some $2000. Heffernan made no redemption, and in 1942,
he died. Plaintiff then filed claim with Heffernan's estate for
the deficiency resulting from the mortgage, and the claim was
5See Note, 79 A.L.R. 717 (1932).
16 5 N.D. 22, 63 N.W. 210 (1895).
17 NJD. Rev. Code (1948) See. 82-1907.
Is 78 N.D. 622, 17 N.W. 2d 906 (1945).
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disallowed. Plaintiff then brought action against the admin-
istratrix of Heffernan's Estate. The trial court upheld dem-
fendant's contention, namely, that the debt was barred by the
six year statute of limitation, applicable to notes.' However,
on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision and gave
judgment for the plaintiff, on the ground that thepromise to
pay the debt was stated in the mortgage he executed, and
since the statute of limitation had not run on the mortgage,
and a deficiency resulted from the foreclosure sale, the plain-
tiff's remedy had not been barred and he could recover against
the estate any deficiency remaining from the foreclosure
sale. The court further stated that a note and the mortgage
were separate contracts, therefore they afforded separate rem-
edies. The Court cited Burrows v. Paulsol,.,20 where it was
stated, "The note and the mortgage are actually two contracts.
One evidencing the debt or obligation, and the other the mort-
gage contract. And in a suit on either, the nature of the con-
tract determines the character of the relief to be afforded.
There is no logical reason why, if action be brought first on
the note and judgment be not satisfied, why recourse cannot
be later had in an appropriate action to the mortgage security,
or, conversely, if resort be had first to the mortgage security
in an appropriate action and a deficiency result, that judgment
might not be taken for the amount of such deficiency in an
action at law.'121
Applying the present law to the above cases, it is apparent
that the plaintiff, in the Lincoln National Life Insurance Com-
pany Case could not sue the estate for any deficiency, but had
his assignor, the Royal Life endorsed the note in blank, he
could have foreclosed the mortgage and recovered the defi-
ciency from the Royal Life Insurance Company as previously
explained. Since the note executed by Heffernan would be
considered non-negotiable, the statute of limitations would not
begin to run against the plaintiff, until the date the Royal
Life Insurance Company endorsed the note over to the plaintiff.
However, the statute would begin to run on the mortgage the
19 N.D. Compiled Laws 1913, Sec. 7375; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 28-0016.
R 64 N.D. 557, 254 N.W. 371 (1934).
21 The interpretation the Supreme Court gave to the 1933 law, S.L. 1933, e. 165,
in the Burrows Case is undoubtedly the reason the legislature'amended the law
in 1937, to make it clear that the remedy of the holder of a defaulted mortgage
was only to foreclose.
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day of its execution by Heffernan and be unaffected by its
assignment to the plaintiff.
As to the Burrows Case, the present law does not give the
mortgagee either the right to choose the remedy he desires to
use, nor does it allow a deficiency, since the present statute 2
expressly limits the holder of a mortgage on default to fore-
closure.
The practical effect of this legislation is to actually return
the law to the methods as originally practiced in equity courts;
there a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage was strictly an
action in rem, and consequently the court had no authority to
render a personal judgment against the mortgagor. -°
Considering the economic condition of the State at the time
the laws above mentioned were passed, they appear to be a
wise and noble gesture, but whether or not they may be so
considered today is debatable. In an attempt to partially abro-
gate the effects of these statutes the 31st legislative assembly
of North Dakota (1949), had before it House Bill No. 302. It
excepted from Sections 32-1906 and 32-1907 any real estate
mortgage executed by a farmer to a real estate agency, if
the farmer had a co-operative association sign as surety on
his mortgage. This discriminatory measure was apparently
the result of political rather than policy consideration.'
DUDLEY W. BUTTS
THIRD YEAR LAW STUDENT
2" N.D. Rev. Code (1943) See. 32-1907.
23 Marling v. Maynard, 129 Wis. 580, 190 N.W. 537 (1906).
24 The measure was defeated in the House of Representatives.
